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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Vincent Stewart appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation and ordering his sentence executed.

Stewart contends the district

court (1) erred by revoking probation without transporting him to the revocation
hearing; (2) abused its discretion by revoking probation; and (3) abused its
discretion by failing to sua sponte reduce his sentence upon revocation.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Stewart was on probation when, during a home visit, his probation officer
found him hiding in the basement. (R., p.9.) During a search of Stewart's home,
law enforcement found paraphernalia used to smoke methamphetamine.

(R.,

p.9.) Stewart admitted using one of the "methamphetamine smoking devices" to
smoke methamphetamine.

(R., p.9.)

During a search incident to Stewart's

arrest, an officer found a baggie in Stewart's sock, which contained a prescription
anti-psychotic drug. (R., p.9.)
The state charged Stewart with possession of methamphetamine.
pp.12-13, 19-20.)

(R.,

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Stewart pied guilty to the

possession charge and to domestic battery and petit theft in two other cases, and
the state agreed to dismiss four pending misdemeanors and to recommend
Mental Health Court.

(R., pp.26-30.)

On the possession charge, the court

imposed a unified seven-year sentence with three years fixed and ordered it to
run concurrent with the sentence in a separate Ada County case.

(R., p.37.)

The court, however, suspended the sentence and placed Stewart on probation
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for four years.

(R., pp.38-39.)

Included among the special conditions of

Stewart's probation was that he "attend and successfully graduate from the
Canyon County Mental Health Court." (R., p.39.)
Less than one month later, Stewart failed to appear for Mental Health
Court and the court issued a warrant for his arrest.

(R., p.40-43.)

At his

subsequent Mental Health Court appearance, the court ordered Stewart to
continue attending Mental Health Court while out of custody pending the
disposition of Stewart's other cases.

(R., p.47.)

Approximately three months

later, the court entered a supplemental judgment that continued Stewart on
probation with the Mental Health Court condition. (R., pp.56-58.) Less than two
months after that, the court imposed SILO as a sanction for his failure to "call in"
or "show up for Health and Wellness." (R., p.59.) Although Stewart completed
the SILO requirement, he failed to appear for his next monthly Mental Health
Court appearance.

(R., pp.61-62.)

Consequently, the court again issued a

bench warrant for Stewart's arrest and, following his arrest, ordered him to serve
14 days in jail. (R., pp.62-66.) Two months later, Stewart was "suspended from
Mental Health Court for several violations of the rules."

(R., p.69 (emphasis

omitted).)
As a result of Stewart's Mental Health Court suspension as well as an
allegation that Stewart committed new crimes, on October 23, 2012, the state
filed a Petition for Probation Violation.

(R., pp.73-80.)

Stewart admitted the

alleged probation violations. (R., pp.98-100.) At the disposition hearing held on
March 7, 2013, the court tentatively agreed to Stewart's request to continue in

2

Mental Health Court, stating, in relevant part: "I do not know if they'll take you
back there, sir. I'm certainly recommending and giving you that opportunity. If
they don't, then you'll be in violation of this program, and I'll have to do
something differently." (Tr., p.17, Ls.4-8; see also R., p.119 (Order on Probation
Violation).)
On March 28, 2013, just two weeks after the disposition hearing, the state
filed a Petition for Probation Violation alleging that, "on March 15, 2013, Mr.
Stewart was denied as a participant in the Canyon County Mental Health Court
program."

(R., pp.120-123.)

The court scheduled the matter for a "Review

Hearing" on April 15, 2013, and counsel for Stewart filed a Motion to Transport
Stewart to that hearing, which the court granted. (R., pp.124-127.) For reasons
that are unclear, counsel for Stewart filed an identical Motion to Transport six
days later; the court denied the second motion. (R., pp.128-131.)
The Review Hearing was conducted on April 19, 2013. (R., p.132.) At the
outset of that hearing, the court stated:
This matter, Mr. Stewart previously appeared in front of this Court
in March 2013. At that time the Court believed that Mr. Stewart,
although he had been terminated from Mental Health Court was
eligible for reinstatement and that in fact he could be reinstated.
The Court then ordered he be continued on probation under the
term and provision that he be reinstated to Mental Health Court.
I now have been advised that Mental Health Court has
chosen not to allow him to go back and obtain Mental Health Court
and that further he had Ada County cases in which he's been
sentenced to prison and would be unable to attend Mental Health
Court in any event.
Is that correct, [counsel]?
(Tr., p.19, Ls.4-20.)
3

Defense counsel responded: "That's correct, Judge. He has been -- they
have revoked over in Ada County as well. He's actually out at the prison right
now."

(Tr., p.19, Ls.21-24; also p.19, Ls.24-25 (court confirms with defense

counsel that Stewart was in prison at that time).) The court then stated:
At the prison. The Court declined to enter an order to transport him
on the basis of Mr. Stewart's inability to complete the probation as
ordered for reinstatement in Mental Health Court. The Court
revokes his probation, that probation order, will impose a sentence
of three years followed by an indeterminate four-year period of time
for a total of seven years.
(Tr., p.20, Ls.1-8.)
Defense counsel inquired whether the judge would recommend the
therapeutic community while Stewart was in custody, and the court agreed. (Tr.,
p.20, Ls.12-20.) Defense counsel made no other requests or objections at that
time. (See generally Tr., pp.19-21.)
On April 26, 2013, Stewart filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency in
his sentence. (R., pp.139-141.) The court denied the motion. (R., pp.144-146.)
Stewart filed a timely notice of appeal from the Judgment and the order denying
his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.142-150.)
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ISSUES
Stewart states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Stewart's constitutional right to
due process when it revoked Mr. Stewart's probation in his
absence?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr.
Stewart's probation?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce
Mr. Stewart's sentence, sua sponte, upon revoking his
probation?
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Stewart failed to show the district court erred in changing its
disposition decision in Stewart's absence or in otherwise revoking his probation?
2.
Should this Court decline to consider Stewart's claim, raised for the first
time on appeal, that the district court erred in failing to sua sponte reduce
Stewart's sentence upon revoking his probation?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Stewart Has Failed To Show Error In The Process By Which The Court Amended
Stewart's Probation Violation Disposition Or In The Court's Decision To Revoke
His Probation

A.

Introduction
Stewart argues "the district court violated his constitutional right to due

process when it revoked his probation outside his presence." (Appellant's Brief,
p.6.) Stewart further asserts the court "abused its discretion when it revoked his
probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

Both of these arguments fail.

The district

court's decision to amend the disposition of Stewart's probation violations, which
Stewart admitted, without transporting him to announce that amendment did not,
on the facts of this case, violate Stewart's constitutional rights. Nor has Stewart
shown the court abused its discretion by revoking his probation given Stewart's
failure to comply with the fundamental condition of continuing him on probation that he attend and complete Mental Health Court.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v.
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378,381,870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)).
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C.

The Court's Decision To Amend Its Disposition Of Stewart's Probation
Violation Without Transporting Stewart Was Not Unconstitutional And
Stewart Has Otherwise Failed To Show Error In The Court's Revocation
Decision
In State v. Done, 139 Idaho 635, 637, 84 P.3d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 2003),

the Court summarized the due process standards applicable to probation
revocation decisions as follows:
[B]efore probation can be revoked, a probationer must be given a
due process hearing.
Throughout probation revocation
proceedings, the probationer is entitled to due process. The
probationer is entitled to be present at the hearing and may be
entitled to counsel.
The probationer must be afforded the
opportunity to be present and rebut evidence and to call and crossexamine witnesses. Prior to the hearing, the probationer must be
given adequate notice of the grounds for revocation.
Stewart's due process rights were satisfied in relation to the allegation that
he violated his probation by being suspended from Mental Health Court. The
state's original Petition for Probation Violation on this basis was filed on October
23, 2012.

(R., pp.73-77.)

At the December 19, 2012 evidentiary hearing

scheduled in relation to the state's petition, Stewart admitted the allegations in
the petition, including the allegation that reads, in relevant part: "on October 17,
2012, Mr. Stewart was suspended from the Canyon County Mental Health Court
program for program non-compliance."

(R., pp. 76, 98-99.)

Prior to the

disposition hearing, Stewart explored the possibility of going back to Mental
Health Court "pending court approval and the outcome of [a] 19-2524 Mental
Health Evaluation." (R., pp.107-108.) Consistent with those efforts, Stewart filed
a motion for a mental health evaluation, which the district court granted.
pp.111-114.)

(R.,

However, that evaluation was not provided to the court prior to
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disposition. (Tr., p.6, Ls.18-19.) Nevertheless, defense counsel asked the court
to consider allowing Stewart to continue participating in Mental Health Court,
arguing:
He's learned a lot from Mental Health Court and wants to
continue to do the option of continuing on. And I do believe that
that is a viable option for him. I know that whether or not he gets
accepted back in is, you know, determined by their vote and what
this Court decides to do today as well. But Judge, we would ask
the Court to consider placing my client back into Mental Health
Court.
(Tr., p.9, Ls.8-16.) Stewart also urged the court to allow him the opportunity to
complete Mental Health Court. (Tr., p.10, L.23- p.13, L.14.)
The court responded:
Mr. Stewart, you having admitted violating your probation, I
do find that you are in violation of your probation. I am going to
impose the sentence previously suspended of three fixed followed
by four indeterminate for a total of seven years. I will suspend the
execution of that sentence and place you back on probation on
terms, same terms and conditions previously imposed, which
includes successful completion of the Mental Health Court program.
I do not know if they'll take you back there, sir. I'm
certainly recommending and giving you that opportunity. If
they don't, then you'll be in violation of this program, and I'll
have to do something differently.
(Tr., p.16, L.19-p.17, L.8 (emphasis added).)
Upon being notified that Stewart was not eligible for reinstatement to
Mental Health Court, the court did precisely what it told Stewart it would have to
do at the disposition hearing - "something different[]" - that something different
being the only real option, revocation, given that any type of probation would be
effectively meaningless since, by that time, Stewart was in prison on other
charges. (See Tr., p.19, Ls.14-25.)
8

Although the state filed a second Petition for Probation Violation upon
being notified of Stewart's non-acceptance back into Mental Health Court, the
April 19, 2013 hearing was not an adjudication of that petition as much as it was
a continuation of the March 7, 2013 disposition, since the disposition
contemplated on that date could not be given effect.

The practical reality,

therefore, is that Stewart was given notice and an opportunity to be heard, i.e.,
due process, on both whether he violated his probation and on the disposition of
that violation having been present at the adjudication hearing, where he pied
guilty, the original disposition on March 7, 2013, and, through counsel at the April
19, 2013 hearing. Stewart has made no reasoned argument explaining how, on
the facts of this case, he was deprived of meaningful notice and an opportunity to
be heard on whether he violated his probation, which he admitted, or whether his
probation should be revoked - especially given the lack of any viable alternatives
to revocation. Cf. State v. Iverson, 155 Idaho 766, _ , 316 P.3d 682, 693 (Ct.
App. 2014) (noting "[d]ue process demands an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" and requiring a showing of
prejudice); State v. Crockett, 151 Idaho 674, 679, 263 P.3d 139, 144 (Ct. App.
2011) (in the context of a due process claim relating to dismissing and refilling
charges, court notes the "prejudice component of the due process inquiry
requires that a defendant show actual prejudice affecting his or her ability to
mount or present a defense").
Instead, Stewart shifts his argument from the claimed due process
violation, which is based purely on his absence from the April 19, 2013, without
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any explanation as to how his presence would or could have changed the
disposition, to a secondary argument that revocation was improper because he
"did not admit to violating his probation" and his failure to gain "re-entry" into
Mental Health Court was not willful.

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

This argument

misses the point because it ignores the actual proceedings in this case. The
court did not "find" that Stewart violated his probation "by being denied re-entry"
into Mental Health Court.

The court's amended disposition did not involve a

finding of a new violation, it was a continuation of the March 7, 2013 disposition
This view is consistent with the court's characterization of the April 19, 2013
hearing as a "Review Hearing" - a characterization to which Stewart did not
object. Indeed, although counsel for Stewart sought to have Stewart transported
to the Review Hearing, at no time did he notify the district court of any desire to
proceed as if the court were considering a new violation. 1 On the facts of this
case, this Court should not endorse Stewart's efforts to do so for the first time on
appeal. 2
Even if the Court considers Stewart's claim that his failure to gain "reentry" into Mental Health Court was not a willful violation, the claim fails.

It is

readily apparent that Mental Health Court was a fundamental condition of

It is likely defense counsel did not make any such objection because he
recognized it would not benefit Stewart to remain on probation in this case while
in prison on another case, which would preclude Stewart from receiving credit for
time served on his current sentence in this case.
1

2

To the extent this Court concludes Stewart's inability to be placed back into
Mental Health Court as contemplated by the March 7, 2013 disposition was a
separate probation violation that should have been treated as such, the state
concedes the standard due process protections were not satisfied as there was
no separate arraignment or adjudication of that alleged violation.
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Stewart's probation and the court's willingness to continue him on probation was
premised on Stewart being accepted back into Mental Health Court. Stewart's
counsel plainly acknowledged that Stewart could not continue in Mental Health
Court and, as the district court noted at the April 19, 2013 hearing (and counsel
agreed), Stewart "would be unable to attend Mental Health Court in any event"
because he was "sentenced to prison" in his Ada County cases.
Ls.14-19.)

(Tr., p.17,

"After sound determination that a probationer could not possibly

perform a fundamental condition of his probation, the judge has discretion to
remove probation and pronounce sentence." State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 47,
436 P.2d 709, 713 (1968). That is precisely the determination the district court
made in this case and Stewart has failed to show that determination was
erroneous. Not only was Stewart unable to comply with a fundamental condition
of his probation, his probation was clearly not consistent with the protection of
society as he continued to commit new crimes during his probationary term. See
State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995) ('The
purpose of probation is rehabilitation" and any cause satisfactory to the court that
probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify revocation.); State v.
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001) ("In deciding
whether revocation of probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the
court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and
whether continued probation is consistent with protection of society.").
district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Stewart's probation.
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The

11.
Stewart's Claim That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Sua Sponte
Reducing His Sentence Upon Revocation Is Not Preserved For Appeal
Stewart asserts the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua
sponte reduce his sentence upon revoking probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1216.) Although Stewart actually filed a Rule 35 motion, which the district court
denied, he does not seek review of that decision, instead challenging the district
court's failure to sua sponte reduce the sentence it later expressly stated should
not be reduced.

Stewart's chosen tactic for challenging his sentence is not

preserved for appeal and he cannot obtain review of this claim under the
fundamental error doctrine because he cannot satisfy the first prong of the
fundamental error analysis - a constitutional violation - because his claim is
based on an alleged rule violation.

State v. Clontz, 2014 WL 2119164 (Idaho

App. 2014). Stewart's sentencing argument, therefore, fails.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order revoking Stewart's probation and ordering his sentence executed.
DATED this 3 rd day of June, 2014.

ESS CA M. LORELLO
(Depu y Attorney General
\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of June, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

ty Attorney General
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